China

China’s overarching “dual-carbon” strategy is articulated through the 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) and the “1+N” policy framework. The top-level “Working Guidance for Carbon Dioxide Peaking and Carbon Neutrality” (Oct. 2021) mandates integrating peaking and neutrality targets across national, sectoral and local plans, with 2025/2030 milestones on energy intensity, emissions intensity, non-fossil energy share, and forest cover. The supporting “Action Plan for Carbon Dioxide Peaking Before 2030” sets economy-wide measures and requires sectoral plans (energy, industry, transport, construction) and provincial implementation. Subsequent State Council work plans (2024) begin piloting provincial carbon budgets and a dual-control system for both intensity and total emissions for 2026–2030. Collectively, these instruments function as China’s green-economy planning architecture, though the legal enforceability of all elements varies by instrument and the net-zero end-date is 2060 (not 2050).

China does not have a national strategy mandating inclusive corporate governance practices such as employee participation on boards or binding gender quotas. Listed companies are required to include employee representatives on supervisory boards, but this does not extend to management-level decision-making or gender balance. The Healthy China 2030 Planning Outline includes broad commitments to equity and inclusion in social development. Internationally, China participates in the UNFCCC Enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender and the Gender Action Plan (extended to 2035), which aim to strengthen gender considerations in climate policy. However, there is no national legal requirement for SDG-aligned ESG practices in corporate governance, and ESG reporting remains voluntary.

China has formal mechanisms for public consultation on major legislation, including through the National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). However, these processes are not fully transparent or inclusive, and participation by marginalised groups (e.g. ethnic minorities, IP/LCs, people with disabilities) is limited. The Plan for Women’s Development (2021–2030) includes gender equality goals, but broader social impact assessments are not systematically applied. International observers and UN agencies have noted restrictions on civil society participation, particularly in sensitive areas.

China has piloted natural capital accounting and green GDP initiatives, including the Natural Resource Balance Sheet Program and Green Development Index. The “Working Guidance” commits to a green, low-carbon, circular economy with supporting indicators, and the State Council’s 2024 carbon-control work plan strengthens emissions accounting and provincial budgeting. These are part of the broader Ecological Civilization agenda. However, these efforts remain fragmented and experimental, and there is no comprehensive national wealth framework covering all capital types. Integration into national planning remains limited.

China promotes green finance mainly through project-based initiatives and multilateral channels. The New Development Bank (NDB) has approved RMB-denominated loans for clean energy, environmental protection, and green digital infrastructure in Shanghai, contributing to SDGs 7, 9 and 11. Sovereign lending is also aligned with China’s development priorities, and domestic banks continue to expand green credit. However, there is no regulation mandating climate-related financial stress testing across the financial sector. The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has run pilot climate stress tests since 2021, but these remain limited in scope and voluntary. Green finance expansion is emphasized in national guidelines, but system-wide mandatory stress testing and penalties for high-polluting investments are absent.

"The People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has incorporated climate and environmental risks into its Financial Stability Reports and piloted climate-related stress tests for major financial institutions. In 2024, the PBoC issued joint “Opinions on Leveraging Green Development” with other ministries, expanding guidelines for green lending, bonds, and financial leasing. In 2025, China raised its fiscal deficit to 4% of GDP and issued over ¥1.3 trillion in green bonds. The PBoC maintained a moderately loose monetary stance and reviewed climate disclosure rules alongside updates to central banking regulations, aligning macroeconomic tools with environmental goals.

China is integrating environmental considerations into its domestic economic transition, but the trade policy dimension remains underdeveloped. The 2024 Guidelines for Green Transition of Economic and Social Development, issued by the State Council and CPC Central Committee, support green industries, carbon pricing, green procurement, and eco-design standards. In parallel, China’s national carbon market (ETS) was expanded in 2025 to include additional industrial sectors, strengthening the role of carbon pricing in trade-relevant sectors. However, despite these domestic reforms, China has yet to include binding environmental chapters in any of its trade agreements. There is no evidence of green taxonomy interoperability or environmental goods liberalization across bilateral or regional trade frameworks. Engagement in global green trade mechanisms—such as the ACCTS or deforestation-free trade protocols—remains minimal.

China launched its national ETS in 2021, covering the power sector, and in 2024–2025 introduced regulatory reforms to strengthen allocation and compliance. The 2025 Guideline by the Communist Party of China and State Council outlines expansion of the ETS to all major industrial sectors (steel, cement, aluminum, etc.) by 2027, with full system construction by 2030. The ETS combines free and paid allocation, with plans to align with international standards and expand voluntary carbon reduction mechanisms (CCER market re-launched in 2024). China’s Updated NDC (2021, reaffirmed 2024) commits to peaking CO₂ before 2030 and reducing net GHG emissions by 7–10% from peak levels by 2035. Enforcement remains a challenge, but the ETS is legally operational and expanding.

"China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) includes goals to raise non-fossil fuel energy use to 20% by 2025 and achieve high-quality green development. The State Council’s Green Transition Guidelines (2024) support fiscal and tax measures that favor green, low-carbon investments, green procurement, and green consumption. Sector-specific standards have been introduced in steel, cement, polysilicon, and data centers, requiring minimum renewable electricity shares and clean production processes. The sector-specific policies are coordinated through top-level planning bodies, including the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Ecology and Environment, with cross-sectoral mandates to implement the “dual carbon” goals (carbon peak by 2030, neutrality by 2060).

The 14th Five-Year Plan for Circular Economy Development (2021–2025) sets detailed goals for building national recycling infrastructure, scaling battery reuse systems, and promoting resource efficiency across heavy industry and urban development. Targets include higher reuse rates for construction waste, recycling of critical minerals, and deployment of industrial symbiosis networks. The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) coordinates implementation across ministries, and the circular economy is embedded in broader policies for carbon neutrality and energy security. While China has not disclosed a specific Circular Material Use Rate (CMUR), its policies span all key sectors, and resource use is progressing toward decoupling from economic growth.

In 2025, sales of electric vehicles (EVs) overtook internal combustion engine vehicles for the first time, powered by aggressive industrial policy, innovation subsidies, and public investment. The national EV roadmap targets 80% market share for New Energy Vehicles (NEVs) by 2030, with additional electrification goals for freight and public transport. Public transit systems in major cities are shifting to electric and hydrogen-powered fleets, while rural areas benefit from expanding charging infrastructure. Low-carbon logistics and digital traffic management platforms are central to China's broader “ecological civilization” vision. Transport policies are coordinated by the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, aligned with China's updated NDC.

"China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and five other agencies released the Renewable Energy Substitution Initiative (Oct 2024), targeting a jump from ~30% to 36% of electricity from renewables by 2025 and further growth by 2030. Installed renewable capacity reached nearly 1.9 TW by end‑2024, and a record 357 GW of new wind and solar was added in 2024—meeting the 2030 target years early. Renewable portfolio standards now apply across heavy industry sectors.

"The ILO’s 2023 “Green Jobs in China” report highlights emerging capacity in green employment and the need for cross-policy alignment. In 2023, the government initiated green skills and training pilots in sectors like renewables and ecological conservation. The UN’s 2023–26 World Social Protection Report references China’s use of social insurance to support workers during climate shifts. National policies remain under development to scale these programs.

China does not operate a single, integrated national “just transition” framework. Elements appear across policies: coal capacity reduction and supply-side reform documents include re-employment support; the 1+N “Working Guidance” emphasizes risk control and safeguarding livelihoods during decarbonization; and social policies are adjusted during structural changes. These components demonstrate balancing of social and environmental objectives in selected sectors, but an explicit, nationwide just transition architecture with sector-specific guidance and benefit-sharing mechanisms is not in place.

China does not provide a separate legal form for social enterprises, but policies encourage MSME participation in ecological industries. The State Council Guideline on Ecological Protection and Restoration (2021) encourages social capital, including SMEs, to invest in ecological restoration through public-private partnerships and natural resource rights use. MSMEs can participate in carbon sink transactions and ecological industry projects under this framework. Large state banks have also provided green loans to SMEs through inclusive finance initiatives. However, these policies do not create a distinct legal category or national regulatory recognition for social enterprises.

"China operates a multi-layered social protection system that includes conditional transfers, pension schemes, and targeted assistance. A Conservation Impact Bond pilot in indigenous regions links conservation to livelihoods, but social protection remains largely disconnected from national green economy planning. Analytical reviews by the ILO and UNDP emphasize the need for better coordination between climate adaptation and social safety nets, China has not yet formalized a national strategy that integrates social protection with green economic reform. Current efforts are fragmented.

China’s biodiversity policy mixes long-standing national strategies with recent system reforms. The National Biodiversity Conservation Strategy and Action Plan (2011–2030) has been implemented and underpins sectoral laws; in 2021, China issued high-level “Opinions on Further Strengthening Biodiversity Conservation” (with 2025/2035 targets). In October 2021, China established its first five national parks (≈230,000 km²), and the Ecological Conservation Redline (ECR) policy legally delineates strictly protected ecological zones nationwide. Reports in early 2024 indicate MEE released an updated “Biodiversity Conservation Strategy and Action Plan (2023–2030)” aligned to the Kunming–Montreal GBF. While the legal and planning framework is strong, publicly available, regular progress assessments with interim, binding national targets tied to SDG 14/15/GBF are not consistently published in English.

China has not yet established a comprehensive natural capital accounting system aligned with the UN SEEA framework. The National Biodiversity Conservation Strategy and Action Plan (2011–2030) defines tasks for biodiversity protection and integration into sectoral planning, including monitoring and evaluation. Pilot projects on natural resource balance sheets have been implemented in several provinces, covering water, land, timber, and minerals. However, there is no national governance structure or independent advisory body with a formal mandate to oversee natural capital valuation in fiscal or infrastructure planning. Integration into policy remains partial and project-based.

China has taken incremental steps toward more sustainable food systems, but lacks a unified national strategy fully aligned with SDGs 2 and 12. While the 2021 National Dialogue on Food Security laid a foundation for transformation, recent developments focus on targeted interventions. In 2024–2025, China initiated pilot programs to source deforestation-free soy and promote sustainable agri-export supply chains, led by SOEs like COFCO. Guidelines for biotech crop cultivation were issued in 2025 to boost food system resilience. However, no national framework sets long-term targets for ecological footprint reduction, dietary change, or harmful subsidy phase-out. Agricultural emissions are addressed through scattered policies, but food loss, nutrition, and procurement reform remain fragmented.

China applies multiple nature-finance instruments: the Environmental Protection Tax Law (replacing pollutant discharge fees) sets pollutant-based levies; eco-compensation is being elevated via 2024 State Council regulations; the national ETS (launched 2021) advances carbon-pricing coverage; and green finance is guided by the 2021 Green Bond Endorsed Project Catalogue and ongoing work with the (EU–China) Common Ground Taxonomy. The National Green Development Fund provides equity for restoration and pollution control projects. These tools represent significant, evolving nature-positive financing architecture; however, systematic elimination of all nature-harmful subsidies and explicit, large-scale, ring-fenced funding streams for Indigenous Peoples & Local Communities (as defined internationally) are limited in public documentation.

COVID-era macro-support combined standard stabilization (“new-type infrastructure,” railways, grid, NEV incentives) with some green components but limited conditionality. Green elements included multi-year purchase-tax exemptions for new energy vehicles (extended through 2027 with tapering), charging infrastructure in “new infrastructure,” and support for clean transport and industrial upgrading; most support, however, was broad-based and not conditioned on environmental performance, and several provinces advanced coal-power approvals during the recovery. Subsequent policy has continued to use tax and industrial measures (e.g., NEV purchase-tax policy) rather than explicit “green-conditioned” bailouts.